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a DecaDe of WorlD social forums: internationalisation Without institutionalisation?
Geoffrey Pleyers introduction
The World Social Forum (WSF) celebrated its tenth anniversary in 2011. Each year between 2001 and 2007 and every couple of years since, this alter-globalisation gathering has drawn up to 170,000 activists from all over the world. In spite of its size, very international nature and numerous logistical challenges, the WSF has not become a tamed and institutionalised place. Indeed, recent meetings were far less institutionalised than their predecessors between 2001 and 2003. Such an evolution contrasts with one of the best established models in social movement studies, asserted by the most prominent scholars in the field (Michels 1911 , Weber 1922 , Touraine 1973 , Tilly 1986 , Kriesi 1993 , Tarrow 1998 , Della Porta and Diani 1999 , Kaldor 2003 . According to this model, movements either dissolve or become institutionalised. They 'take the familiar path from charisma to regularised routine, from inventiveness and passion to bureaucracy, hierarchy and instrumental reason' (Walker 1994 : 677, quoted in Kaldor 2003 . Institutionalisation is widely considered as a 'classic stage [of] social movements' natural history' (Touraine 1973: 353) . It brings an end to a 'cycle of contention': 'At its height, the movement is electric and seems irresistible, but it then erodes and gets integrated through political process' (Tarrow 1998) .
The process of institutionalisation entails internal and external dimensions. Internally, movements evolve from loose structures to professionalised, hierarchical organisations (Tilly 1986 , Kriesi 1993 , which brings an increasing power to the movement's leaders over its grassroots members, as stated by R. Michels' 'iron law of oligarchy ' (1962) [1911] . Externally, movements are progressively integrated into institutional politics (Tarrow 1998) or become self-help networks, whose main purpose is to provide services to their members (Kriesi 1996) . Movements usually lose much of their critical stance in the process: 'The more movements become groups of interest, the more they risk losing their historicity [the questioning of society's major orientations]' (Touraine 1973: 354) . Indeed, 'taming is not just about access. It is about adaptation of both sides. When authorities accept part of the agenda of protest, the movements modify their goals and become respectable' (Kaldor 2003: 83) .
The fact that the WSF has not become an institutionalised organisation relying on strong leaders and professional organisers is even more surprising given that a strong connection between a movement's internationalisation and its institutionalisation has been asserted by eminent scholars. Social movements' internationalisation is supposed to lead to a 'proliferation of organizations, brokers and political entrepreneurs specialized in connecting those populations and coordinating their action' (Tilly 2004: 155) .
In the 1990s, the rise of a global civil society was indeed strongly associated with the institutionalisation of many of its actors. That period witnessed the multiplication of international NGOs that relied upon professional activists, able to fulfil the funding applications of international institutions and to conduct international advocacy campaigns (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Kaldor 2003) . In the early 2000s, observers thus predicted a quick and massive institutionalisation of the emerging 'global civil society'. Jonathan Friedman (1999) has showed how strongly the 'discreet charm of bourgeoisie' operates on delegates from local indigenous movements, who were progressively transformed into a group of elite global activists after being projected into international arenas by taking part in UN negotiations on the rights of indigenous people. Charles Tilly's future scenarios for social movements directly bind internationalisation, institutionalisation and an increasing power of their elite.
If the scenario of internationalization prevails, we might reasonably expect some further consequences for popular politics. First, given the minimum requirements of large-scale social movements for information, time, contacts, and resources, the existing elite bias chaPter 10 
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a DecaDe of WorlD social forums | 167 of social movement participation would increase … Second, for this reason and because of uneven access to communication channels … excluded people would suffer even more acutely than today from lack of means to mount effective campaigns and performances … Third, brokers, entrepreneurs, and international organizations would become even more crucial to the effective voicing of claims by means of social movements. (Tilly 2004: 155 ; see also Tarrow 2005) As both a global and a mass event, the WSF was expected to follow the path of quick and massive institutionalisation. How then can we explain that recent forums were actually less institutionalised than the first forums: less centralised, less dominated by elite activists, with a diminished influence of INGOs and political parties? This chapter suggests that, while a pattern of institutionalisation exists within the WSF process, it has been countered by the political culture of WSF activists; a culture that favours horizontality, internal democracy and the active participation of grassroots actors. The first section focuses on internal dimensions of the institutionalisation process, analysing the evolution of the organisation of WSF panels and the power of a group of intellectual leaders. The second section focuses on the evolution of the place of more institutionalised civil society actors (INGOs and political parties) in successive WSFs. Their number and influence is supposed to increase with an institutionalisation process.
This analysis relies on an extended qualitative research conducted since 1999 at eight World Social Forums, as well as field work conducted in alter-globalisation organisations and at events in Europe and the Americas, including the 2010 US Social Forum in Detroit. The argument presented here also draws on several chapters dedicated to the alter-globalisation movement from previous Global Civil Society yearbooks.
from institutionalisation to Decentralisation

2001-03: towards an institutionalised and hierarchical Wsf
Over its first three meetings, all held in Porto Alegre, the WSF process experienced increasing institutionalisation and professionalisation (Desai and Said: 2003) . From January 2001 to January 2003, WSF attendance shot up quickly, from 15,000 in 2001 to 50,000 in 2002, reaching the 100,000 mark in 2003 (see Map 10.1) . This resulted in major logistical challenges for the organisers, and gave an increasing power to the professional team employed by the 'Brazilian Secretary of the WSF'. Logistical aspects, including fundraising (Timms 2006) , took on a greater importance, despite the fact that some contributors were corporations criticised by some groups of activists.
Charles Tilly (2004) and Sidney Tarrow (2005) maintain that social movements rely far more on 'mobilisation professionals' at the international scale than at the local scale. The alter-globalisation movement was no exception. Initially, its growth largely relied on the prestige and fame of committed intellectuals, on their legitimacy as experts in the analysis of globalisation and on their international networks of affinity. Working as scholars or for NGOs, intellectuals possess the necessary time and resources (economic, cultural and social capital) to attend international forums and their preparatory meetings, which leaders of grassroots movements often lack. They were thus able to attend and connect the protests against corporate globalisation that took place over the world, and to convene convergence meetings (Houtart and Polet 2001) .
The burgeoning of civil society and alter-globalisation parallel summits in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Pianta 2001 (Pianta , 2002 and Chapter 11 this volume, Box 11.2) gave rise to informal but very influential global affinity groups of elite and globalised activists, with a clear dominance by older male intellectuals whose activism and world visions are rooted in the 1970s antiimperialist perspective. As one finds in other sectors of global civil society (Chandhoke 2002: 48) , many of the leaders of the International Council (IC), who had the upper hand in deciding WSF guidelines and on the main WSF panels, lacked social constituency and representativeness (Pleyers 2008) . In many aspects, the 2001 WSF resembled an academic congress, with intellectuals and scholars monopolising the large panel discussions -and even the majority of the smaller workshops. The IC held its meetings behind closed doors, with security guards at the entrance and, to most activists, the organisation of the forum appeared 'so opaque that it was nearly impossible to figure out how decisions were made or to find ways to question those decisions' (Klein 2002: 204) .
In 2001 and 2002, the 'VIP lounge' provided the clearest illustration of the assumed hierarchy between elite and 'ordinary' participants. This concept of a top-down forum became even stronger in 2003. While to many the 100,000-plus member audience was an exciting reflection of the dynamism of the forum, the Brazilian organising team noted at the pre-Forum IC meeting that they were The events unfolding across North Africa and in the Middle East gave the forum an added relevance. Roaming in the lush avenues of the Cheick Anta Diop University campus, activists exchanged views on daily transformations occurring across the Maghreb-Mashreq, and those from the region were courted for news, explanations, analysis, inspiration. Some just wanted to know how they could do the same: bring about democracy, justice, equality, rights in their oppressed countries. And soon the forum became the backdrop of opportunity against which activists came together to project into the future plans and activities of change, imbued with a new sense of hope.
The expectations of organisers, partners and participants varied enormously, but there were commonalities. Inevitable comparisons were made to the previous WSF, held in Belem, Brazil, in 2009; and to the last African WSF, the controversial WSF of 2007 which was held in Nairobi, Kenya (see Map 10.1) . For many, the key success of the Belem event was the ability of the organisers to include a wide range of indigenous movements, and the fact that subsequently a close connection was established between the forum and those activists who worked in the region. In this sense, Dakar matched the successes of Brazil, with the significant participation of activists from Senegal, West Africa and, indeed, the whole continent, brought together by a thorough and inclusive pre-event mobilisation.
Nairobi was perceived as problematic for a number of reasons, particularly for its relative exclusiveness, heightened by the difficulties and cost of getting to the venue and by the controversies on the role of some Christian organisations and other large NGOs. In contrast, Dakar was open and accessible, and, as noted during the International Council (IC) meeting that followed its closure, at the same time militant and assertively political. The event was notable for its inclusiveness and the diversity of participants. At the opening march, tens of thousands of people marched through Dakar, including local minorities and unions, Senegalese peasants and their regional partners. And the outreach continued in the following days: there was an experiment of virtual decentralisation via the internet (the 'Dakar Extended' project allowed remote participation); the organisation of events in the suburbs by groups like the World Assembly of Inhabitants; the visit of a delegation to the unplanned settlement of Baraka. In this sense, Dakar was a confident step along the journey of the African chapter of the WSF.
An important trend in global activism, both highlighted by the Dakar forum and a contributing factor to its success, was that many activists had networked with local partners and other groups in advance, expressing a key concern of strengthening regional and global alliances on shared issues. Those convergences, at the heart of WSF's mission, seem to indicate a clear trend towards the consolidation of transnational alliances. Some took place before the WSF itself, others in its last days. The World Charter of Migrants, for instance, was launched on Goree Island, in Dakar, following two days of meetings with activists from all corners of the planet. A solidarity convergence on Palestine, the first ever to be organised at the forum, attracted hundreds of activists. And media activists converged a communication assembly to take stock of communication activism in the era of Wikileaks, and to examine the influence of social media on street protests as in the Maghreb-Mashreq. Aptly, all computers in the press centre, donated by Oxfam, were running on GNU/Linux to stress the research and practices that many in the WSF are conducting on the common creation and ownership of intellectual rights.
Among the processes that did not work as expected in the Dakar forum was the 'agglutination' of self-organised activities. Part of the event methodology since 2005, this process facilitates the convergence of different workshops and seminar organisers towards shared activities around similar topics in order to foster networking among potential partners. If this process had been more successful, it was argued, a considerably smaller number of events would have had to compete for the limited spaces available in the venue. As an Indian activist put it, instead the open space this year had become a 'grab-a-space space'.
The new university rector did not honour the commitments agreed to by his predecessor, who had promised both the suspension of classes during the forum to allow students to participate to the WSF, and the allocation to the organisers of the forum of the entire campus for their activity. When such an opportunity was denied at the last moment, confusion and a
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GCS2012_10_chap10 168 16/02/2012 10:45 a DecaDe of WorlD social forums | 169 degree of frustration spread among participants. New tents were pitched to host the events and a lot of creative scheduling was hurriedly performed, but it took a while for all to become familiar enough with the spaces and schedules, which were posted daily on notice boards around the campus. It was estimated that, in the end, only 80 per cent of the activities took place as planned. Whereas creativity, expediency, ingenuity and, most important of all, genuine solidarity marked the trajectory of many lost souls in the avenues of the campus, fiddling with their phones and escorted by welcoming volunteers, a darker side to the initial confusion was raised by many. Competition for spaces and the varying abilities of activists to convene last-minute audiences generated a phenomenon profoundly at odds with the values of the forum. In general, there are great imbalances of connections and social capital among WSF participants. Some network on the basis of their relations, extend their reach and feel more included; others prefer to rely on structured programmes and feel lost when they fail. The last-minute venue confusion in Dakar created a position of privilege among those activists and organisations with tighter networks and larger resources, while it excluded and alienated those who had joined the forum for the first time, or those not closely connected with other activists.
The logistical issues were not the only ones. Outrage was caused by the confrontations between Moroccan activists and supporters of the independence of the Saharawi people from the Moroccan state. There were also problems with the ambitious 'Dakar Extended' web-based project, which failed to implement the programme as planned due to lack of resources and spaces. And there were protests by those who found it unacceptable that Coca-Cola and Danone products were sold at the food stalls or that water was sold at three times the street price. In the same vein, others questioned the extent to which it is coherent with the WSF vision that activists house themselves in expensive hotels, and whether it would have been more appropriate to stress the organisational commitment on solidarity accommodation with local activists.
Yet even these problems were not without value: many reflected on the shortcomings of the forum, and their considerations became sophisticated reflections on causes and responsibility, and on criteria to assess outcome and impact in ways that were coherent with WSF's values. A working group was set up to conduct an open evaluation of the forum, with a preliminary report presented at the IC meeting in Paris in May. And what the organisers could not do, Dakar did. Welcoming people, warm weather and the soft blow of the Harmattan over the sparkling ocean; an enthusiastic IC member stated during the WSF evaluation that it was the friendliest city in which a WSF had ever taken place. Another emphasized that it had been the safest forum for women. This alone would be enough to celebrate Dakar and the 2011 WSF. Then there was the impressive cultural programme, complemented by the many options for inspiration and celebration that the city offers. And there was much cause for celebration: on the closing day of the forum, the news spread that Hosni Mubarak had finally fled in the face of the unrelenting, unintimidated and increasingly confident crowds of Tahrir Square. Despite the many setbacks and problems along the way, a decade of World Social Forums came to a close on an unmistakable high.
giuseppe caruso is a post-doctoral researcher at the Centre of Excellence for Global Governance Research -University of Helsinki, a board member of the Network Institute for Global Democratization, and a WSF International Council founding member. He writes a blog on the WSF at giuseppecaruso. wordpress.com.
GCS2012_10_chap10 169 The International Council was set up to give guidance to the Forum. It meets two or three times a year, usually coinciding with a social forum or event. Initially, members were the scholars and leaders of social movements who had been involved in the organisation of the first WSF. Membership of the IC was viewed as an important strategic position, providing members with the chance to affect the direction and organisation of the WSF.
Although it grew rapidly, attendance was strictly regulated by its founders and meetings were more or less secret, leading to the perception that it was a meeting of VIPs. At the first meeting, a text was adopted to clarify IC tasks, its major responsibility being to formulate WSF strategies (see Sen and Waterman 2009: 72) . At the IC in Miami in 2003, six commissions -Methodology, Content, Strategy, Communication, Resources and Expansion -were established, which remain in place today. Notably, when the first questions about 'restructuring' the WSF arose after the Mumbai WSF, Chico Whitaker defined the objectives of the IC as promoting the expansion of the WSF process, giving it more visibility and enhancing the transition from event to process.
In practice, the main decisions taken by the IC concern two issues: the structure of WSF and of the IC itself; and the major political controversy behind the movement: is the WSF merely an 'open space' (see Whitaker, 2006: 81) , or also a place for action?
At the IC in Barcelona in 2005, the first political debate took place. It was nothing more than a long series of individual statements, every speaker receiving exactly five minutes without any attempt to make a synthesis. It did lead, however, to the first specific debate on the space versus action opposition: more than one hundred written contributions were received on the website and the debate took place at the IC in Abuja in 2008. Unfortunately, what came out of the discussion had very little resemblance to the wealth of opinions that were received.
At the same meeting in Barcelona, a draft road map for the restructuring of the IC was created, to tackle perceived problems of legitimacy. Real power, so it was said, was in the hands of a highly political secretariat. With these plans put into action, the IC evolved into a meeting of many participants, with decisions made by consensus. In order to make this more efficient, an idea grew of constituting a 'Liaison Group'; a technically-minded group of people who would prepare the meetings and coordinate the activities of the different commissions and working groups. This was eventually created at the IC held in Berlin in May 2007. Today, an attempt is being made to better coordinate the activities of the different commissions.
What observations of ten years of IC meetings suggest is that the supposed 'open space' of the WSF is really quite structured, and that further structures are added in order to hide the real power relations behind the Forum, rather than to actually democratise the IC. It has become a highly self-referential exercise. Power remains in the hands of those founders who still attend the IC, and in those of their allies, irrespective of their legitimacy or their practical contribution to the council. Power is informal but real.
A second observation is that decisions are not always respected. Sometimes a group of people succeeds in pushing through an idea, which is then broadly discussed; but once the decision is taken, it somehow disappears … For example, this happened with a document of 'Guiding Principles' for the organisation of WSFs. The principles were adopted in Copenhagen in September 2008, and have never been heard of since.
A third observation is the lack of transparency. The IC is no longer a secret meeting. Members receive a balance sheet after every WSF, so that it is known what was budgeted and what was spent. However, decision-making remains largely opaque.
At every WSF and at every IC it is repeated that one purpose of the WSF movement is to create a 'new political culture'. Yes, the social movements present at the IC have, for the most part, achieved much in the practice of listening to and discussing with each other. But the IC is still far from the democratic and political ideal (see Pleyers 2004 Pleyers , 2007 that it was intended to be. worried about how they would be able to 'manage the crowds'. To solve this logistical challenge, they opted for mass lectures: famous intellectuals and political leaders were chosen as speakers while 'ordinary' participants were relegated to the role of a huge but passive audience. Around 11,000 people attended the speeches of cosmopolitan intellectuals like Noam Chomsky and Arundhati Roy. On another day, over 100 panels were cancelled to ensure that 60,000 people would listen to and applaud Lula, the newly elected Brazilian president.
2005: from critics to cross-fertilisation
Two years later, when the WSF returned to Porto Alegre after the 2004 session in Mumbai (Caruso 2010) , it could have been expected that the record audience (now over 170,000 people) would lead to even more centralisation and institutionalisation. Yet the 2005 forum actually looked very different. Everything was angled to enable participants to take an active part in meetings and discussions. Instead of massive crowds listening to famous intellectuals, hundreds of tents hosted smaller and more participatory workshops. In many cases, after short introductory talks, the audience split into discussion groups, giving each person the opportunity to express an opinion. The organisation of panels and the choice of the speakers were transferred from WSF organisers and IC members to the participating organisations, which considerably lessened the role of leading intellectuals and IC leaders. This bottom-up dynamic gave the event a new and refreshing momentum. It showed that a 170,000-strong gathering could allow space both for grassroots participation and for autonomous organisation by activist networks. Activists' reflexivity, and their will to create a more horizontal and participatory forum, had a determinant impact in counterbalancing the institutionalisation patterns that the WSF had previously followed. The organisation and assumed hierarchy of the WSF increasingly came under fire from participants, who insisted on the value of democratic opening and on experimentation with concrete alternatives, and opposed an IC 'that concentrates lots of power but is accountable to no one' (delegate of the Italian trade union COBAS, WSF 2004).
Activists used the 'open space' (Whitaker 2006 ) provided by the WSF to implement horizontal and participatory processes both within and in the margins of the WSF. 1 Activists in the autonomous spaces within the youth camp, women's movements (Wrainwright 2004 , Dufour et al. 2010 ) and the network of activist interpreters' 'Babels' have been particularly engaged in promoting more participatory models of relations and in stressing the need for consistency between the values defended by the movement and the organisation of the WSF (Pleyers 2010a: part 2). They repeatedly urged members of the IC to adopt horizontal and participatory practices. In 2002, young activists engaged in a festive demonstration that invaded the WSF 'VIP lounge' with the slogan 'We are all VIPs' (see Juris 2008) . The VIP lounge was immediately closed, and never reappeared at any other Social Forum.
The 2003 WSF suffered particularly strong criticism. It led leaders of the IC to progressively open themselves to the idea that the WSF needed to become more horizontal and participatory. In January 2004, the message was largely accepted and even relayed by various founding members of the IC: 'The sons and daughters of Porto Alegre are not here … We have to change the methodology of the Forums. We need a democratic dialogue.'
2 The modalities of a more decentralised way of organising the forum then became the main focus of the fifth WSF preparation process.
While a rising institutionalisation could have paralyzed the 2005 forum, critiques from grassroots activists and interactions with IC leaders opened the way for a more inclusive and participatory event. From this perspective, the tension between different conceptions of the WSF and its organisational form, which is expressed primarily through conflicts and debates among activists, must not be mistaken for a diversion or deficiency of the alterglobalisation movement. On the contrary, it creates cross-fertilisations (Della Porta 2006) and a dynamism spurring the movement to innovate (Pleyers 2010a) .
The tension between the trend towards institutionalisation and the wish for open, horizontal and participatory practices is indeed a structural feature of the alter-globalisation movement. It is visible at each and every scale of movement, from the IC to local coalitions and even in discourses and wishes of individual activists, 'We shouldn't have very institutionalised and well-established organisational structures … But of course, we need some structured organisation to be able to work effectively together' (a young activist from Attac-Germany, in Hurrelmann and Albert 2002: 315).
after 2005: a Permanent tension
The fight against 'residual forms of avant-gardism' (Glasius and Timms: 2006) over. Even the 2005 WSF reality was not the 'total selforganisation' and '100 per cent horizontal process' that J. Miola, the 'WSF executive manager', claimed it was (interview in Libération, 1 February 2005) . This was notably highlighted by the process behind the 'Porto Alegre Manifesto', which was written by 19 intellectuals without consultation with other WSF participants and was presented to the press in a five-star hotel. One year later, the 'Polycentric WSF' (P-WSF) was held in three locations: Bamako, Caracas and Karachi. At least two of these three events were dominated by elite activists. The organisation of the Bamako P-WSF widely relied on a small group of Malian professional activists, well inserted in international networks. In many aspects, they seemed much closer to their European fellows than to their country's grassroots activists. As for the event in Caracas, it was largely appropriated by committed intellectuals who were keen for the forum to get closer to Latin American political leaders, and who gave this P-WSF a clear political orientation. Caracas was, however, also home to various autonomous forums. The open and participatory 'Alternative Social Forum', set up by Libertarian activists, adopted a critical attitude towards the 'vertical' and 'authoritarian' organisation of the 'official' forum. Its limited size allowed deep debates and discussions that had been forgotten in the larger events (cf. Pleyers and Ornelas 2011).
Since 2006, the power of some of the WSF founding leaders has also been eroded 3 by the rise of a new generation of experts and advocacy networks, less based on prominent and mediatised intellectuals and more committed to horizontal relationship both between activists and among member organisations of alterglobalisation networks. The testimony published by Matti Kohonen in Global Civil Society 2011 provides a vibrant illustration of the new dynamic that they have fostered. Then an LSE postgraduate student, and the international coordinator of the Tax Justice Network and of the Network Institute for Global Democratisation, Kohonen's concept of activist networks allies quality expertise with a decentralised and open way of working.
In other cases, the transition from organisations centred on historic leaders and intellectuals to more decentralised and participatory networks has had dramatic consequences. The confrontation between these two types of structures was particularly vigorous within ATTAC-France, the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions and Aid to Citizens. Founded in 1998, its French chapter was the most prominent group of the alter-globalisation movement in that country. In 2006, an electoral fraud was orchestrated at the internal national elections in favour of the organisation's historic leaders (Passet 2006) . The latter subsequently lost most of their seats on the board at the new elections, held a few months later. The German chapter of ATTAC had its own shake-up in 2007. Most founding members eventually resigned from the national coordination committee in both countries, and ATTAC evolved towards a less hierarchical, more collegial, more decentralised structure, with a younger and more gender-balanced steering committee: two members of ATTAC-Germany's new national committee were aged 24 and 26, and the new co-chair of ATTAC-France was a 27-year-old woman.
The process of cross-fertilisation between WSF leaders and activists who promoted an open, horizontal and democratic movement organisation intensified after 2006. In the WSF IC, as in many other alter-globalisation networks, much energy has been devoted to discussing and rethinking the forum and its preparatory processes in order to reconcile openness, flat hierarchy and democracy with the efficiency required for an event of its size. Rather than speeches by star intellectuals, grassroots activist networks and more horizontal thematic expertise networks became the dynamic engine behind the world and continental Social Forums. It was particularly clear at the 2011 WSF that the forum owed much of its dynamism to networks dedicated to issues such as housing, climate change or international financial institutions. Moreover, the fact that the WSF has been hosted by different cities after 2005 has prevented the local organising committees from becoming as professionalised and as powerful as the Brazilian committee did between 2001 and 2005, when four WSFs were convened in Porto Alegre.
grassroots actors and ngos in the social forum Process Political Parties
The international nature of the WSF increases the need for resources and organisational capacity, which political parties and INGOs are able to provide. Moreover, the WSF seems particularly vulnerable, as open spaces 'that belong to no one' (Whitaker 2006) and that are dedicated to discussion and debate are 'constantly subject to invasion' (Kaldor 2003: 46) : social and political actors want to take credit for the process, to take advantage of its coverage or to seize its political outcome. Many expected that the forum would quickly become dominated by INGOs or be swallowed up by political parties. That initial seed has grown through the committed and painstaking work of Moroccan activists and their regional partners. After successful local events in Morocco which were attended by thousands of activists from across the entire region, the Maghreb Social Forum finally came of age in July 2008, in the city of El Jadida. This first official regional forum saw the participation of 2300 activists from 28 countries. In the months following the exhilarating experience of El Jadida, activists from the Maghreb and Mashreq networked intensely, working towards a wide regional meeting that would engage activists from Mauritania to Iraq. Such a meeting eventually took place in Rabat, Morocco, in early May 2009. It was then that the MMSF was officially launched. Since that time, the forum has expanded in scope; it has spearheaded, among other events, the recent global thematic forums on Education (Palestine 2010) and on Health, Land and Water (Cairo 2010).
At the same time the regional process has fed back into national forums like the Tunisian Social Forum (TSF), which, oppressed during Ben Ali's regime, is currently blossoming. As would be expected, the social forum framework in the region has been greatly enhanced by the current atmosphere of change, and by the feeling of possibility shared by activists throughout the region and beyond. In early April, following the departure of Ben Ali from Tunisia, the TSF hosted a global delegation of activists convened by the African Social Forum, under a collective decision taken by the International Council of the WSF in Dakar in February (see Box 10.2) . Shortly after, a delegation of the MMSF visited Tunisia and held meetings with the local activist on topics of transitional justice, development and activist mobilisation, and to reflect upon the challenges of the democratic transition.
This flurry of solidarity and mobilisation continues to take shape. At the latest International Council meeting of the WSF, held in Paris in May 2011, it was decided that the next WSF, to be held in 2013, will take place in either Tunis or Cairo. In the meantime, a series of regional, continental, national and thematic events will be arranged, starting in July 2011 in Tunisia. A Solidarity Forum with Palestine will be organised in Egypt, and a global seminar on the same topic will take place in Brazil. In Montreal and in Santiago de Compostela, large events will be organised under the aegis of the WSF, focusing on the revolutions and their global effects, and their contribution to the development of alternative civilisational paradigms, patterns of migration and of labour, goods and services markets.
The revolutions of the Maghreb and Mashreq regions are not over; there will no doubt be setbacks and counter revolutionary attempts, as it is common of revolutions. It is in this context that transnational activist networks and global civil society forums could become tools of collaborative activism and spaces of debate and reflection aimed at supporting the democratic transition. The WSF has offered itself as one such space, and, if the successes of the MMSF are anything to go by, it is a space with transformative potential. The WSF Charter states that forums are spaces dedicated to social movements and citizens. Political parties are welcome as a passive audience (see Glasius and Timms 2006) . However, at each of the Latin American and Indian WSFs, a few stages and panels have been given to local and national political parties and leaders. In 2001, a stage in the final session was provided to local and national leaders of the Brazilian Workers' Party (PT). Lula took part in each of the WSFs in Brazil, and both Indian Communist Parties were very visible at the 2004 WSF in Mumbai. The peak of the influence of political parties on the forum was reached at the 2006 P-WSF in Caracas, where speakers at the main stage took every opportunity to repeat their solidarity with Hugo Chavez' 'revolutionary process'. This eventually resulted in divisions among the IC, with some members opposing the 'politicisation' of the forum. One year later, politicians and parties were almost invisible at the 2007 Forum in Nairobi and 'politics-oriented activists' have clearly lost ground in subsequent forums. The debate over the participation of progressive political leaders is far from over, and probably never will be. However, ten years after the first WSF and in contrast with many predictions, the WSF has not been overthrown by a single political orientation.
nairobi 2007: an ingos' Wsf
NGOs have played an important role in the alterglobalisation movement. They have brought new ideas, a repertory of action (including the counter-summits; see Pianta 2001, 2002, and Chapter 11 this volume, Box 11.2) and have helped to finance WSF events and travel costs for African and Asian activists. NGOs and INGOs were very active in the WSF between 2002 and 2006; however, the fact that they largely dominated the 2007 WSF in Nairobi raised a wide range of criticisms.
The 'decentralisation' of organisation that has been in operation at the forums since 2005 has had at least one perverse effect: the number and visibility of panels at each forum has depended less on the relevance of the issue at stake than on the financial resources of the organisation that has proposed it. In order to stage a workshop, it helps to be able to rent a room within the forum, advertise the discussion panel, pay the speakers' fees and travel, and so on; NGOs are usually more able than grassroots movements to play this game. This was particularly evident in Nairobi, where, for example, the US NGO Action Aid alone held 36 workshops. Their audience was often limited to the NGO's members and partners, for whom it had booked several hotels.
Both the main themes in the 2007 WSF programme and the logistical organisation of the forum reflected this supremacy of NGOs. Far more panels focused on international institutions and on the development aid sector than on local struggles. Moreover, the choices made in the organisation of logistics impeded the participation of poorer local people, with a venue remote from the city centre, expensive water and food sold by private companies on the WSF site, and security guards to prohibit access to those who were unable to pay the entrance fee. The International Assembly of Social Movements in Nairobi and the Kenyan network's 'People's Parliament' fiercely denounced the 'privatisation, commodification and militarisation' of a forum 'squandered by the lack of compassion, compounded by the great arrogance exhibited by the organisers' (Mbatia and Indusa 2011 [2007] ).
The Nairobi experience deeply affected many WSF organisers and participants, increasing their suspicions about the excessive participation of NGOs and their will to defend 'the prominence of grassroots social movements' in the forums (a member of the IC, 2007). Consequently, the influence of NGOs has declined considerably in subsequent forums. When the WSF came back to Africa in 2011, it was a very different event, 'open and accessible, and … at the same time militant and assertively political … notable for its inclusiveness and the diversity of participants' (see Box 10.1). Not only was it easier for local people to come to the forum, the forum also went to the people; the World Assembly of Inhabitants, organised in a suburb of Dakar, was perhaps the most notable of the events organised externally (see Box 10.1).
international networks of grassroots movements
The evolution of the relationship between NGOs and social movements within the WSF process has both been fostered by and reflects one of the most significant changes in global civil society in the past decade: grassroots networks have realised that their internationalisation did not necessarily require NGOs.
Critiques against some NGOs' practices have risen within and beyond the forum. African local activists complain that they have been instrumentalised by NGOs: 'Some NGOs use us to hold money and contracts but never listen to us.' 4 They denounce their 'double-talk: they speak about participation, but concretely, associated movements have little or no room to discuss the project'. some ended up monopolising access to the international arena. Grassroots movements thus decided to build their own international networks (which often compete with INGOs), as well to develop their own expertise. At the 2006 Bamako P-WSF, Paul Nicholson, a leader of Via Campesina, 6 argued that peasants 'no longer want NGOs to speak in our name to international institutions and about agricultural policy. We want to build our own movement, our own international network and to speak for ourselves.' The creation of the International Alliance of Inhabitants reflected a similar process: 'We are not worth less than NGOs. Actually, I would even say we are worth more, because we have a social constituency … We decided to carry their own destiny, not only in the neighbourhood, but also at the international level.' 7 From that perspective, the WSF has been a powerful tool. It has facilitated networking and knowledgesharing and has given a global platform to locally-rooted struggles. Via Campesina has been one of the leading actors of the WSF process from the beginning; since then, dozens of other international networks have been created at the forums, including the Network Institute for Global Democratization, the European and African network for the defence of water as a common good and No Vox, a global network that gathers homeless peoples', landless peasants' and illegal migrants' organisations.
the us social forum
The desire to prevent NGOs from taking the lead in the Social Forums is particularly strong amongst the US Social Forum (USSF) organisers. Rather than creating a space equally welcoming to all members of civil society, the USSF founding document states it should 'place the highest priority on groups that are actually doing grassroots organizing with working class people of color, who are training organizers, building long-term structures of resistance'. 8 They consequently excluded North American INGOs and philanthropic foundations, 9 as they wanted to avoid the forum being led by 'policy and solidarity organisations that lacked a base in the most marginalised communities in the US' (Leon Guerrero 2011) . This decision resulted in smaller forums (about 15,000 activists at each of the first two USSFs), and in additional organisational and financial challenges. After the first preparatory meeting in 2002, it took five years and dozens of local and national gatherings to set up the first US Social Forum.
Rather than holding the forum in cosmopolitan cities, which would likely have attracted thousands of left-wing intellectuals and the staff of major NGOs, the USSFs are held in cities with major poverty concerns and, to date, large African American populations: Atlanta in 2007 and Detroit in 2010. This has resulted in very multicultural, racially and generationally diverse forums (Karides et al. 2010) , with the strong participation of domestic workers and minorities, and with spotlights on issues such as immigrant rights, the right to the city, or racism within movements and civil society organisations. By addressing the informal barriers that prevent certain sectors of society from attending Social Forums (Smith et al. 2008 , Pleyers 2004 , the USSF has helped to redress the domination of white and middle-class activists (Martinez 2000) , perceived previously both within more general alter-globalisation spaces in the US and in many of the WSF.
Weaknesses and limits
Contrasting with theories on social movement evolution and internationalisation, the WSF has not become a tamed and more institutionalised place. Its historical leaders and committed intellectuals have lost much of their power while grassroots activists have found more space in recent forums. The push towards institutionalisation that dominated the first three WSF has been countered by the will of alter-globalisation activists to maintain an open space, and by their predilection for grassroots movements over political parties and powerful INGOs.
Drawing on a comparative study of 53 American social movements, W. Gamson (1975) showed that the more bureaucratic movement organisations were more efficient and more successful in political struggles, notably thanks to a clear division of tasks. This argument has been contested (for example, Fox Piven 1978) and needs to be nuanced, as new technologies have provided new coordination tools and as social movements relying on loose networks have shown they could be efficient. 10 However, there may indeed be a price to pay for limited institutionalisation. In the case of the WSF, this is particularly notable in terms of the efficiency of the logistical organisation, the lack of cumulative knowledge, in maintaining attendance sizes and in promoting the visibility of the WSF in dominant media and amongst policy-makers.
With exponential experience of previous forums and increasing professionalisation, the Brazilian Organising Secretary became more efficient between 2001 and 2005. As the WSF has, since then, moved to a different country each year, and as it has not become more institutionalised, each forum constitutes a new logistical challenge
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for a team that has scant experience in convening such a large international meeting. The logistical organisation of the 2011 WSF in Dakar was indeed a nightmare for all the participants. Many tents remained empty, despite the fact that local organisers were unable to assign venues for hundreds of workshops. Participants spent hours looking for the panel that they planned to attend, as the morning's programme was often only made available that same afternoon.
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Limited institutionalisation may also be one of the factors that have led to smaller audiences and a drop in media coverage. Compared to previous social forums, both the USSF and the 2011 WSF in Dakar had lower attendance figures (15,000 and 40,000, respectively). In each case, the IC chose to prioritise geographical and social extension (that is, beyond the usual white middle-class activists) over the size of the audience. The formula for gathering a large number of activists is actually relatively simple and well-known: a professional team to deal with logistical issues, a host city that is easily accessible and which boasts strong local movements and clear political support. Ideally, at least as far as the WSF are concerned, this city would additionally be located in Brazil (120,000 people attended the 2009 WSF in Bélem). It may also help to delegate the central organising role to more institutionalised and richer global civil society actors, such as INGOs, which are able to efficiently advertise the WSF, organise workshops and pay for the flights and fees of guest participants. Professional organisations with clearly identified leaders and members with communication skills and training are also far more efficient in procuring global media attention. Since, within the WSF, historical leaders have lost ground and the alter-globalisation movement has become more horizontal, its visibility has decreased, even in the midst of a major financial and economic crisis.
Moreover, organising self-assessment practices and open decision-making processes are difficult and time-consuming tasks. The WSF ideal of participation by the greatest number often conflicts with the need for efficiency in meetings, when time is short and decisions must be made. Efforts to improve internal democracy and the openness of decision-making processes slow down and make more complex the answers to problems in a changing context (Sikkink 2002: 312) . While WSF activists have put much time and energy towards developing a more open and democratic forum, and the USSF has made progress in giving the central role at forums to excluded categories of the population, the answer to global crises -the raison d'être of the forum -has seemed slow and unclear.
conclusion
Civil society internationalisation in the 1990s was characterised by strong institutionalisation and a taming process that quickly transformed new social movements into respectable NGOs (Kaldor 2003) . The WSF process and the rise of some international networks of grassroots actors suggest that activists may have developed a new pattern of internationalisation without institutionalisation by focusing on grassroots actors and promoting more participatory and horizontal organisation. While global civil society had a tendency to be assimilated to INGOs in the 1990s, global activists have fostered a diverse global civil society, of which INGOs remain a major component, but where networks of grassroots actors have also found their way.
The ten-year-long experience of the WSF suggests that the strong reflexivity of alter-globalisation activists, along with their promotion of horizontal and more participatory organisation, has had a considerable impact on the forum's structure and organisation. Together with other factors, such as the rising use of new information and communication technologies (NICT) and the culture of networks (Castells 1996-98) , this has contributed to building a different model of internationalisation. The example of the WSF compels social movement and global civil society scholars to pay greater heed to the reflexivity and political cultures of activists as a determinant factor in the evolution of social movement organisational forms (Jasper 2010, Goodwin and Jasper 2004: 17-23) .
While institutionalisation leads to a homogenisation within a movement and to its integration into mainstream political processes, the WSF has increased its diversity, remaining an open space where tensions between different components and concepts of the forum constitute the engine of its constant evolution and adaptation. The success of the forum lies less in its ability to overcome and close internal debates (for example, 'Should it be a space for movement or a political actor?': cf. Whitaker et al. 2006 , Cassen 2006 , Glasius and Timms 2006 see also Doerr 2008) than to maintain a constructive tension between different poles of opinion. In doing so, the WSF may, in part, realise what the editors of the first Global Civil Society yearbook designated as one of the primary purposes of global civil society: to be 'a supranational sphere of social and political participation in which citizens groups, social movements, and individuals engage in dialogue, debate, confrontation and negotiation with each other and with various governmental actors' (Anheier et al. 2001: 4) . One root of the alter-globalisation movement -also known as the 'global justice' movement -lies in a reaction to transformations in the field of development NGOs. Since the 1990s, the World Bank and the IMF have relied on what they considered to be the 'comparative advantage' of NGOs in terms of efficiency, cost and output, mobilising them in public-private partnerships (Kaldor 2003) . Numerous NGOs were solicited by international institutions to provide social services where the 'strategic adjustment plans' imposed by international institutions impeded states from doing so; between 1990 and 2000, the percentage of NGOs stating that their objective was to provide social, medical and educational services grew by 79 per cent, 50 per cent and 24 per cent respectively (Kaldor, Anheier and Glasius 2003: 15-16) . Far from their utopian beginnings, many NGO activists disliked being reduced to bandaging wounds resulting from the application of the Washington Consensus, while struggling within a competitive NGO market. Some of these activists became convinced that improving the situation of the South would occur primarily through a change in policy and ideology in the North and in international institutions. Many of them thus turned towards the alter-globalisation movement, of which several became founders and leading actors (such as Bernard Dreano, author of Chapter 3 in this volume), transitioning from development aid to the struggle against neoliberal policies and global institutions.
Against the dominant idea that 'there is no alternative' to neoliberal policies (cf. Box 5.2) in the shift to a globalised world (Albrow 1996) , alter-globalisation activists have developed two pathways for 'ordinary citizens' to have an impact and become actors in the global age. One focuses on reason and expertise; the other on subjectivity, creativity and experience.
In the 'way of reason', activists believe in more active citizens, familiarised with scientific knowledge and able to get involved in debates on global issues, especially in public economics. They propose alternative policies to the Washington Consensus and produce expert reports to show that neoliberal policies are not only socially unfair but also irrational, according to scientific criteria. They consider the major challenge to be the binding of the sphere of finance and economy to social, cultural, environmental and political standards. While the first operate at a global level, the latter remain largely reliant on nation-state policies.
Therefore, 'way of reason' activists underline the urgent necessity of stronger and more democratic international institutions and supranational regulations, with the power to manage the global economy and to set up redistribution and participation at a global level. Their conception of social change is institutionalised and rather top-down, as it focuses on policy-makers, global institutions and regulations. Correspondingly, their organisations are often hierarchically structured. Although they promote a more participatory society, many alter-activist organisations have been reluctant to implement internal participatory management and have shown little consideration for internal democracy.
In the 'way of subjectivity', activists struggle to defend their creativity and the specificity of their lived experience against the hold of a consuming culture, capitalism and global corporations. Their conception of social change is clearly bottom-up: rather than attempting to change policy agendas, these activists seek to implement their own values and alternative solutions in their daily lives, in local communities and in the organisation of their groups and networks. They insist in consistency between the values defended by the movement and its practices. Indigenous Zapatista communities in Mexico, social and cultural centres across Europe and networks of young alter-activists thus seek to create autonomous spaces 'free from power relations', where they experiment with horizontal networking, alternative consumption and participatory decision-making processes.
A constructive interaction between these two concepts of social change and two types of organisational structuring may overcome some of their respective limits and drifts. The cultural actors' arguments help to limit the power of experts and intellectual leaders within the movement, and counterbalance its institutionalisation process. Conversely, intellectuals and citizens who promote rationality will avoid a withdrawal of the movement into local spaces and communitarian experiences, thus helping some alternative solutions to reach policy-makers. Taken together, these two sets of experimentations offer concrete ways forward for a multidimensional approach to building a global society, which simultaneously acknowledges the key role of self-transformation, local communities, citizen activism, national policies and international institutions.
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